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THE FICHTEAN IDEA OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND THE HUSSERLIAN PROJECT 
by Jean Hyppolite* 
Translated from the French by Tom Nemeth 
Introduction to Hyppolite. The following article by Hyppolite 
appeared, along with other articles by a number of distinguished 
philosophers, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Husserl's 
birth in 1859. The name of Jean Hyppolite is most likely already 
known to most of you due in part to his massive commentary on Hegel's 
Phenomenology and his collection of essays on Marx and Hegel. 
Hyppolite,* who was born in 1907 and died in 196 8, rose to the very 
top of French academic life receiving an appointment to the College 
de France in 196 3 after having previously taught at both the 
Sorbonne and the Ecole Normale Supe'rieure. For most of his life 
his interests centered around what Engels called "Classical German 
philosophy" becoming especially interested in Hegel at the age of 
22. At that time there was no French translation of the Phenomen-
ology and almost no translations of any of Hegel's writings. 
Hyppolite, not knowing the German language, was thereby forced to 
learn German by reading the Phenomenology in the original. His 
interest was further heightened by the publication of Jean Wahl's 
Le malheur de la conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel and 
articles by Koyre (a student and friend of Ifusserl) on Hegel. In 
the 30's Kojeve's lectures on Hegel (which were purposely avoided 
by Hyppolite) further, and in fact greatly, increased French 
interest in that old German. One cannot help but imagine that 
someone who was as interested in Hegel as Hyppolite would seek out 
the various, most important influences on Hegel, one of whom was 
Fichte. 
Around the same time as the Hegelian Renaissance in France 
the growing influence of Husserlian phenomenology also became 
manifest. By the late 20's the influence of Bergson had already 
peaked and the younger generation of philosophers were ready for 
some tiling new, a philosophy which dealt with the concrete. Through 
the investigations of Jean Cavailles, Maurice de Gandillac, and 
*What follows is largely taken from John Heckman's "Hyppolite and 
the Hegel Revival in France" in Telos, Summer 1973, #16, pp. 128-145. 
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Emmanuel LeVinas, Husserlian phenomenology was brought into France 
and immediately recognized by a host of young intellectuals, among 
whom Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Aron are perhaps best known, as just 
what they were looking for. After this, Husserl's philosophy spread 
like "wild fire" among French philosophes. Even the Hegel Revival 
was influenced by this discovery as is evidenced by the work of 
both Koyr6 and Kojeve who saw Hegel employing a "descriptive 
phenomenology" (in the Husserlian sense of the expression) in the 
Phenomenology of Mind.** 
Such then was the intellectual climate which formed the back-
ground against which the work of Hyppolite appeared. In our own 
time and setting a similar revival is occurring both with regard 
to Husserlian phenomenology and German idealism. Yet in the U.S., 
and the world in general, scholarship on Fichte has been very 
scarce indeed. His chronological position between that of Kant 
and Hegel coupled with his metaphysical, almost mystical, doctrines 
can perhaps account at least in part for this neglect. Many simply 
overlook the rather "pure objective idealism" of Fichte out of 
sympathy for the more "Marxian-izable" philosophy of Hegel. Such 
attempts almost inevitably lead to an occlusion of the telos in 
Hegel or a Utopian state, in theory, at some future time whose 
connection to the concrete historical processes is unfathomable. 
Thus in order to clarify Fichtean epistemology for those who 
might otherwise be repulsed Hyppolite suggests a Husserlian 
mediation which will hopefully both clarify the great originality 
of Fichte and show him as a thinker who still has something to 
say today. 
**Kojeve, in his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, writes: 
"The Hegelian method, therefore, is not at all 'dialectical': 
it is purely contemplative and descriptive, or better, 
phenomenological in Husserl's sense of the term." 
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The Fichtean Idea of the Science of Knowledge 
and the Husserlian Project 
Comparisons of philosophical systems are always artificial 
when they are done from the outside. Such comparisons cause us 
to lose sight of the differences and resemblances found in the 
original intentions of the systems themselves. Our purpose here, 
therefore, is not to compare the Idealism of Fichte and Husserlian 
Phenomenology. The differences between the systems are too readily 
apparent. This is why, following the lead of Husserl in the 
Cartesian Meditations, we will attempt a Fichtean mediation; we 
will try to investigate the philosophical plan of Fichte in the 
first Science of Knowledge of 179 4. It is in freely seeking to 
understand the intention and philosophical project of Fichte that 
we hope to rejoin from the interior with the theme of rigorous 
science found in Husserl and that of the relationships between 
this science and lived experience. 
We begin with Fichte's idea of a science of science, of a 
"science of knowledge" (Wissenschaftslehre), put forth in the 
remarkable opus of 1794, On the Concept of the Science of 
Knowledge or What is called Philosophy, wh~ich is his 11 discourse 
on method". From this project of a science of science we pro-
ceed until we reach the fundamental problem of the relation of 
this science to lived experience and to the primordial* 
(1*originaire) in the human spirit. 
I. The Concept of the Science of Knowledge. Fichte shares the 
commonly held opinion, admitted by all philosophers prior to him, 
that philosophy is a science, but it is on the content and the 
object of this science that divergences are manifest. But 
Fichte says, "Doesn't this divergence come about because the idea 
of science, which everyone wishes to confer on philosophy, is not 
completely developed?" "How does the full determination of the 
characteristics of science thereby determine the concept of philos-
ophy itself?" 3 In this case the determination of a single 
characteristic--that which makes a rigorous science a rigorous 
science in the strict sense—clearly suffices to determine phi-
losophy. Philosophy would be the clearly developed idea of science 
as such, the very project of science. This is what Fichte calls 
the science of science or the science of knowledge. It is, then, 
first of all a matter of living or experimenting up till the end 
of science, of explicating from it the project and fundamental 
theme even before realizing it. Its realization would then be 
the proof of the project's soundness. Fichte's opus, On the 
Concept of the Science of Knowledge, is precisely the expose of 
the project of such a science before its effective realization. 
We first of all follow the project up to the point where it will 
lead us to the problem of the relations between this theme of 
science and the primordial experience of the human spirit, by 
which we see that this science of the conditions of science is 
not just formal. 
What should a science be in order to be an effective science? 
It should be rigorously founded, the systemization being only a 
second condition. This is why the problem of an apodictic 
foundation is the central problem of Fichte's thought. A partic-
ular science represents a particular domain of learning, a 
specific region of knowledge, and it then rests on a foundation 
whose solidity is admitted in order to substantiate the consequences 
from it. But it is this very foundation which in its turn must 
be established, and the project of science then becomes the project 
of an absolute foundation to all the foundations. This absolute 
foundation would give the other foundations legitimacy, and they 
would be articulated in relation to this absolute and unique 
foundation. The latter in its turn would not be founded on any 
other thing than itself. One could then speak of a situation of 
particular sciences, of an articulation of these sciences which 
would discover their place in this supreme foundation, which could 
no longer be placed anywhere since it would be the condition of 
each situation. 
What we have seen thus far is the theme of a science of 
knowledge, of an epistemology in the literal sense of that word. 
One remark becomes necessary here—Fichte does not mean by 
epistemology, or science of knowledge, a study of the particular 
sciences which after him will become epistemology, a sort of 
history of the sciences or the a posteriori reflection on them, 
but a study of the plan of science, of the exigency of an 
apodictic foundation to science as such. 
A science has at the same time both a content and a form— 
what is known and what one knows of it--the object of the knowledge 
and the knowledge of this object. In a particular science the 
content and the form are distinct, in the science as such, which 
is absolutely founded, the content and the form should identify 
themselves; knowledge and its object should no longer be able to 
be distinguished. An absolute foundation cannot be such that it 
is its own proper object and its proper guarantee. I have no 
reason to speak, not of a first logical principle, but of a 
fundamental medium of knowledge! Thus the knowledge is itself 
known; it is absolute knowledge in being knowledge of the knowledge, 
or knowledge of itself. It is in this sense that Fichte places the 
consciousness of self at the summit of his science of knowledge. 
Of course, it is not a matter of a psychological subjectivism. 
Fichte seeks, then, the sources of what is uncontestably shown as 
the being, as the non-I, in a consciousness of the transcendental 
self. The Fichtean project of a science of knowledge is therefore 
the project of a total reflection in the immanence of all the 
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sciences of experience and of the experience itself. This is 
the Kantian question, radically posed: "How is science possible; 
how is experience possible?" But whereas the method of Kant is 
apagogical, the method of Fichte wants to be ostensive, i.e., to 
join to the knowledge of the truth that of its sources. 
The pursuit of the absolute foundation should therefore be 
accompanied by a discovery of this foundation, of a relation 
between philosophical reflection and the primordial thus placed 
in the light. That way, in spite of the constructive idealism 
of Fichte, of the dialectical deductions of his system, there is 
always in it a problem of the relationship between the exposition 
of this system (which is the work of philosophical reflection) and 
the primordial experience of the human spirit. The most charac-
teristic phrase of Fichte in this regard appears to me to be the 
following: "We are not the legislators of the human spirit, but 
its historiographers." 4 In order to explain this in a systematic 
way we must concern ourselves with discovering the very medium 
of the fundamental knowledge which bases all knowledge. That a 
like reflection, that a like return to knowledge on itself will 
sprout from it into all particular knowledge, into every experience, 
is not doubtful. But the effectuation of this total reflection 
which allows the various sciences to remain elsewhere protecting 
them from it, is what requires an arbitrary decision, a free act 
which starts the movement of philosophy. 
II. The Diverse Problems of a Science of Knowledge. In the 
opuscule of Fichte, to which" we have referred and which alone 
contains the explication of a project of philosophy as a rigorous 
science, Fichte considers four essential problems to such a project. 
1.) "How can the science of knowledge be sure to encompass 
all human knowledge including the knowledge to come?"5 
2.) "Each foundation of a particular science of knowledge 
thus constitutes part of the science of knowledge." 
"How therefore can the latter be distinguished from 
the particular sciences?"^ 
3.) "The science of knowledge claims to give to all the 
particular sciences their form,"? how then is it dis-
tinguished from logic which has the same claim? 
4.) Finally the science of knowledge is itself a science— 
the science of science—it therefore has an object, this 
object is the primordial system of knowledge; how does 
it act with regard to its object? 
We could not imagine examining these diverse problems to the 
extent that Fichte does in his expose; we would only like to show 
the essentials of his project and the spirit which appears to us to 
motivate it. 
Philosophy being the science of science as such, should be 
absolute knowledge; it should contain the foundation of all the 
particular sciences and exhaust this foundation. But doesn't the 
same claim go against the sense of experience which is always un-
finished, which is always implied of new encounters? It is known 
how, after Fichte, the Hegelian notion of an "end of knowledge," 
or the Marxist notion of an "end of history" arose from dis-
cussions and objections. Fichte always wants to preserve the 
absolute apodictic knowledge, which is the very requirement of a 
science and the "open" character of an unfinished experience. He 
wants to lay the foundation for the openness of experience which 
is encountered in absolute knowledge itself. The Hegelian critique 
of the Fichtean false infinite appears to us to disregard the 
fruitful import of Fichte's intention. Absolute knowledge thus 
would not be the historical end of knowledge, but the justifica-
tion of its openness. If one wonders "how is experience possible," 
this amounts to asking "how is encounter possible without so much 
as implying an absolute transcendence?" "We only encounter what 
we understand, but we understand only what we encounter." The 
encounter and the comprehension are mutually conditioned—this 
is the profound theme which Fichte abstractly presents, but the 
significance of which we cannot escape. The encounter of the 
Other is the condition of the understanding, and the understanding 
the condition of the encounter of the Other. "One has then," 
writes Fichte, "to have no fear of it concerning the perfecta-
bility of the human spirit; it is clearly assured by it and placed 
beyond doubt." 8 Absolute knowledge, the knowledge in immanence, 
is not opposed to the indefinite richness of experience; it shows 
how this richness is possible; the "closing of absolute knowledge 
does not exclude the openness of experience." This Fichtean con-
ception appears to us to be particularly remarkable. It justifies 
precisely what one expects from experience, the encounter, without 
falling into an empiricism or a scepticism; it establishes in 
immanence the very possibility of this encounter. In being a 
transcendental science, a science of the conditions of experience, 
absolute knowledge justifies the experience itself. One would 
almost be able to say that the transcendence of the encounter in 
experience finds its guarantee in an integral immanence placed at 
its base; it is what would signify the transcendental. 
But this immanence, this consciousness of the primordial self, 
can be seen as the absolute philosophical life; or is it only con-
structed, laid down by an act of reflection and a proper abstrac-
tion of the philosopher? It is this point in the thought of 
Fichte which appears to us to be the most difficult to understand. 
The science of knowledge is for him a systematic exposition, a 
rigorous deduction, however it refers to a primordial experience 
tliat it discovers and hides. It is this very coincidence between 
the systematic exposition and the primordial which constitutes the 
proof and the supreme test of his thought. In this idea of science, 
then, it is not a matter of a construction analogous to a mathe-
matical one, of a previous logical system, but of an exposition 
that always refers to a fundamental experience which it explicates; 
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we have already cited this characteristic phrase, "We are not 
the legislators of the human spirit, but its historiographers". 
The Fichtean project becomes a little clearer to us in the dis-
tinction which it makes between logic, the science of form, and 
the science of knowledge, which cannot isolate the form from the 
content, the form from its sense. Logic studies the form as such, 
that which composes the validity of the rigorous chains in the 
diverse sciences or in the diverse regions of knowledge, but the 
science of knowledge lays the foundation for this form. Logic is 
a particular, even artificial, science which decides to isolate 
the form from its authentic sense and which has the right to do 
it. But then it ceases to be a philosophical science, for it 
ceases to consider the very meaning of the form. "It is far from 
the case that logic lays the foundation for the science of know-
ledge; rather it is the reverse that it is true."^ The logical 
propositions can be abstract but they are only guaranteed by their 
transcendental significance. Formal logic does not constitute an 
ensemble of necessary laws which, as such, would first determine 
being, but their necessity first rests in a transcendental experience 
of the necessary. The Kantian idea of a transcendental logic envelops 
the idea of a formal logic. It still remains to be asked what the 
word "logic" signifies in the expression "transcendental logic." 
What is this supreme logic which transcendentally bases all logic? 
If the science of knowledge is not a logic, is it then a 
psychology of knowledge? Certainly notJ The idea of the supreme 
science which Fichte envisages goes beyond, at the same time, both 
the idea of a pure logic and that of a psychology. On the con-
trary it is starting from it that one should be able to comprehend 
the logical forms, as well as the key concepts of which the whole 
of empirical psychology makes use. It seems to us then that one 
can already discover in Fichte, particularly in his conception of 
the transcendental imagination, the idea of a science which would 
be the science of meaning (even more than of essence) and of the 
origin of all meaning. The passage from logic to the transcendental 
would be the passage from form to meaning; but the supreme science 
would not be given the entire meaning as the other sciences, it 
would seek the very meaning of meaning for us. Fichte interprets 
the discovery of the transcendental of Kant as the discovery of a 
new milieu, of a new reference overtaking at the same time both 
logic and psychology. Wouldn't this milieu be the milieu of 
meaning, and wouldn't the new ontology be the reduction of being 
to meaning and the study of the problems implied by this reduction, 
more specifically that of the very meaning of being? 
III. The Science of Knowledge and the Primordial. The science of 
knowledge is for Fichte the systematic, and then deductive, account 
of this universal science of science, but insofar as it is science 
it has an object. The question is posed then of the relations 
which can exist between this systematic account and this object 
which cannot be an object like the others, since it could not be 
radically distinguished from its exposition. 
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If we are only the historiographers of the human spirit, it 
is that the primordial knowledge exists prior to its exposition and 
then that it is already known before being encountered. The ex-
plicit system is born from a formal decision, that of raising to a 
clear consciousness of self what consciousness is in itself. This 
free decision cannot give to itself the rules for recovering the 
primordial knowledge, the object and the form implicit in the 
science of knowledge, some groping and even a sort of genius is 
necessary, moreover it is necessary that a primordial experience 
be revealed to us, and that our exposition can rejoin it and cover 
it up, from which a historicity in Fichte's thought can be seen 
to arise with a theory of the primordial and of repitition. All 
philosophies, said Fichte, have had this sense of the primordial, 
but they have not succeeded in exposing it. There is, then, a 
sort of roving in the human spirit around this preexistent pri-
mordial knowledge. The method of Hegel's Phenomenology is already 
outlined by Fichte: The philosophical consciousness and the ordi-
nary consciousness should be reunited. The philosophical conscious-
ness reflects on the ordinary consciousness, but its reflection is 
valued only in the measure where the ordinary consciousness can 
understand itself in the philosophical consciousness. The phil-
osophical consciousness alone can only build an abstract con-
struction; its proper object is the experience lived by the ordi-
nary consciousness, this is what must be realized and what must 
be understood, but this understanding is only possible because the 
ordinary consciousness is already in itself the philosophical 
consciousness. It is already in itself reflection on itself and 
knowledge of knowledge. Thus the philosophical knowledge and the 
lived experience of the ordinary consciousness should form a 
circle which guarantees the validity of a science of knowledge, 
but it is necessary to go farther. "The representation," writes 
Fichte, "is the supreme and absolutely first action of the phi-
losopher as such; the absolutely first action of the human spirit 
could well be another action."1° The philosopher can only explain 
the representation, the form, but the latter can only find its 
foundation beyond itself. We know that for Fichte the primordial 
action of the human spirit is not the representation but the prac-
tical action. The absolute genesis of meaning presupposes for him 
a passing of every purely theoretical perspective. 
It is precisely in the expose entitled "Doctrine of Practical 
Science" that we see Fichte devoting himself to a genetic deduc-
tion and no longer to a construction of human knowledge; he attempts 
to show why consciousness instead of being reflected on itself, is 
perpetually open on the outside. The direction of the ego as con-
sciousness of the absolute self, should be centripetal, should 
alone be knowledge of the self} why then is its direction also 
centrifugal? Why does the activity of the ego aim for an object 
instead of being directed solely toward the self? This direction 
toward the Other, the opening for an encounter, which again could 
be called "intentionality" is what Fichte finds necessary to explain. 
Therefore, he has not ignored this "intentionality" which he has 
called "the objective direction of consciousness," he has wanted 
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to explain it genetically. If the ego should also be reflected, 
it is only able to do it by being open for an encounter; the en-
counter and the reflection are some mutual conditions. Each en-
tire experience is this encounter with the Other which is at the 
same time a discovery of the Self; one understands only by en-
countering; one encounters only what one understands. Reflection 
in immanence is only possible by the indefinite opening of a 
transcendental field. But this field is not only open so that the 
ego succeeds in representing to itself its own infinite richness; 
it is open so that the action is possible, for the finished meeting 
is also the obstacle to surmount, and the fundamental in the human 
spirit which philosophy represents is not itself a representation. 
Here at the end of our expos£ we may be allowed to proceed 
beyond our initial project—the conditions of a science of knowledge 
in Fichte—so that we may approach the very content of Fichtean 
thought. We have wanted to show based on an example—a sort of 
absolute genesis of intentionality in the works of Fichte—the 
richness of this thought. One today often has the tendency to 
reproach the abstract character and construction of Fichte's 
dialectic, but it is necessary to go beyond this exterior aspect 
and to notice in the Fichtean dialectic both a sort of meaning of 
logical forms and a logic of psychology. The notions of transfer, 
of forgetfulness, of encounter, of alienation, of primoridal, and 
of repetition are explained in the course of Fichte's deduction. 
These concepts which are found at the base of so many contemporary 
philosophies are presented by Fichte as of the moments of a supreme 
logic of philosophy which is its science of knowledge. 
To seek a medium in the midst of which to situate all thought 
and all science, and to attempt to establish a relation between 
this rigorous science and lived experience, and even primordial 
experience is the double intention of Fichte. He seeks to reunite 
in depth lived experience and rigorous science. Yet isn't this 
also the very intention of Uusserl in the Philosophy as a Rigorous 
Science, in the Formal and Transcendental Logic, and In" the final 
theme of a "phenomenological reduction?" The exterior comparison 
would surely be deceptive and artificial, while the thorough in-
vestigation of the two projects does not appear to us to be so. 
But in this way we only want to open a discussion. 
University of Kansas 
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NOTES 
This essay is to be found in the French in Husserl et la 
Pensee Moderne, "Phenomenological Series", The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1958, pp. 173-182. 
2 
This word has been translated in various ways. Though 
"originary" is probably closer to the original intention of 
Husserl, it would appear in this context somewhat clumsy and 
strange. "Primordial" is a word found often in common speech 
and yet carries the particular connotation that seems just 
right here. 
3Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Fichtes Werke, Erster Band, Leipzig, 
Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911, p. 166. This and all subsequent 
quotations of Fichte have been translated from the German. 
4Ibid., p. 208. 
5Ibid., p. 186. 
6Ibid., p. 185. 
7Ibid., p. 196. 
8Ibid. , p. 195. 
9 * Husserl et la Pensee Moderne, op.cit., pp. 186-187. The 
translator has not been able to find tne reference in Fichte. 
Fichte, op.cit., p. 211. 
